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MinireviewWhat’s So Special
about Human Tool Use?
mologous circuits in humans (e.g., Culham and Kan-
wisher, 2001).
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of the limb’s position into a motor plan. In macaques,Hanover, New Hampshire 03755
these transformations are accomplished within a circuit
interconnecting one or more regions located within the
medial intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and dorsal premotor
Evidence suggests homologies in parietofrontal cir- cortex (PMd) (Andersen and Buneo, 2002; Johnson et
cuits involved in object prehension among humans al., 1996). Area PMd is well situated for computing pre-
and monkeys. Likewise, tool use is known to induce movement plans for reaching. It receives direct visual
functional reorganization of their visuotactile limb rep- and higher-level proprioceptive input from the superior
resentations. Yet, humans are the only species for parietal lobule (SPL). Likewise, somatosensory informa-
whom tool use is a defining and universal characteris- tion concerning limb position is provided to PMd via a
tic. Why? Comparative studies of chimpanzee tool use circuit interconnecting PEc/PEip-F2. This sensory input
indicate that critical differences are likely to be found is integrated within PMd neurons to form plans for using
in mechanisms involved in causal reasoning rather a particular limb to reach to a specific target location
than those implementing sensorimotor transforma- (Hoshi and Tanji, 2000). Evidence for a “reach” circuit
tions. Available evidence implicates higher-level per- in humans involving putative homologs of medial intra-
ceptual areas in these processes. parietal cortex and PMd has recently been reported
(Johnson et al., 2002).
Interacting manually with objects in the environment Grasp System. Grasping involves integrating repre-
poses considerable challenges for the sensorimotor sentations of objects’ intrinsic spatial properties (e.g.,
systems of primates. Electrophysiological studies of shape, size, texture) with properties of the hand and
nonhuman primates suggest that these problems are fingers. In the macaques, this is accomplished in a more
solved by functionally specialized parietofrontal circuits ventral parietofrontal circuit connecting the anterior in-
that transform sensory representations of the body and traparietal area (AIP) and area F5 located in ventral pre-
the surrounding environment into motor plans for pre- motor cortex (PMv) (Sakata et al., 1997). Area AIP con-
hension (reaching, grasping, and manipulation of ob- tains several subpopulations of “manipulation” cells that
jects). The efficiency of these solutions is attested to by represent specific types of hand postures necessary for
the universality of dexterous prehension among pri- grasping objects of differing shapes. Area F5ab receives
mates. a major projection from AIP, and cells appear to repre-
Tool use introduces a new set of difficulties. The phys- sent specific manual actions (Rizzolatti et al., 2002). In
ical characteristics of the tool, its relationship to the humans, significant activation within the anterior IPS
body and to the surrounding environment all impinge (putative AIP) and inferior frontal cortex is observed
upon its effective utilization. While many species dexter- when objects are grasped (Binkofski et al., 1999), and
lesions in this circuit produce deficits in configuring theously use simple tools to solve problems in their environ-
hand to engage objects effectively (Binkofski et al.,ments, the ability of even our closest living relative, the
1998).chimpanzee, to solve environmental challenges through
Manipulation System. Visuotactile representations oftool use pales in comparison to that of young children.
peripersonal space centered on the body part involvedWith growing evidence for homologies among primates
in a given visually guided action, such as object manipu-in parietofrontal circuits that control prehension, the ob-
lation, are constructed in a circuit connecting the ventralvious question is why?
intraparietal area (VIP) with area F4 in PMv (GrazianoHomologous Parietofrontal Systems
and Gross, 1998) (Figure 1). The majority of units in F4for Prehension
are bimodal, having tactile receptive fields (RFs) thatAs summarized in Figure 1, electrophysiological studies
are in register with 3D visual RFs of space immediatelyof macaques reveal the existence of parietofrontal cir-
adjacent to the animal. Similar RF properties are foundcuits that are involved in sensory-guided prehension.
in VIP and in cells distributed throughout the IPS. WhatThe precise computations implemented within these cir-
is special about these units is that their receptive fieldcuits are a source of ongoing research and debate that
properties are altered by tool use. Specifically, as shownexceed the scope of this review (see Andersen and Bu-
in Figure 2, visual RFs expand when monkeys use a rakeneo, 2002; Marconi et al., 2001; Rizzolatti and Luppino,
to retrieve other objects (i.e., food pellets; Iriki et al.,2001). Nevertheless, parietofrontal circuits involved in
1996). Visual RFs normally in register with tactile RFs ofreaching, grasping, and object manipulation have been
the hand now encompass peripersonal space occupieddistinguished, and a growing body of evidence from
by the rake. Importantly, such expansion is not observedfunctional neuroimaging points to the existence of ho-
when monkeys unsuccessfully attempt to retrieve food
with an ineffective manipulandum (Figure 2). Therefore
the increase in the representation of peripersonal space*Correspondence: scott.h.johnson@dartmouth.edu
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Figure 1. Parietofrontal Areas Involved in Sensorimotor Transformations
Parietal and frontal areas that are interconnected are shown in the common colors. Blue denotes areas receiving input from prefrontal cortex.
(A) Parcellation of the motor, posterior parietal, and cingulate cortices displayed on mesial and lateral surfaces of a macaque brain. (B) The
intraparietal sulcus unfolded to reveal functionally defined areas. Adapted by permission from Rizzolatti and Luppino (2001).
depends on whether a manipulandum is used to achieve studies of our nearest living relatives, chimpanzees, sug-
gest that processes involved in reasoning about objects’an intended goal (Obayashi et al., 2001).
Similarly, using tongs that extend the reach versus physical properties and causal interactions may hold
the key to complex tool use behaviors.fingers to manipulate small objects is associated with
increased activation in the ipsilateral IPS in humans (In- Comparative Studies of Tool Use in Chimpanzees
Amid growing evidence for homologous mechanismsoue et al., 2001). Moreover, patients with parietal lesions
demonstrate behavioral effects that nicely compliment involved in the control of prehension among primates,
one might not expect profound differences between hu-the single unit data from macaques. For instance, a right
parietal damaged patient with unilateral left-neglect evi- mans and chimpanzees in the capacity for tool use.
Unlike macaques, chimpanzees are well known to usedences the expected right-bias when asked to bisect
a horizontal line in near space. The patient performs and even manufacture tools in the wild, and classic
experiments by Ko¨hler long ago demonstrated that theynormally when bisecting lines located beyond periper-
sonal space with a laser pointer. Interestingly, when are capable of using objects to solve sophisticated
problems. Yet, a series of elegant studies by Danielbisecting distant lines with a handheld stick, left-neglect
is again evident. Similar to expansions of visuotactile Povinelli and colleagues reveals heretofore overlooked
limitations on the ability of chimpanzees to solve toolRFs in IPS neurons, use of a tool causes distant space
to be remapped as “within reach,” leading to a neglect- use problems that are surprisingly simple from a human
perspective (Povinelli, 2000). Keeping with the discus-related bias in performance (Berti and Frassinetti, 2000).
Parietofrontal circuits involved in reach, grasp, and sion above, consider the ability to use a rake to retrieve
a food item. Chimps have no difficulties with this taskobject manipulation undoubtedly form the foundation
upon which more complex tool use behaviors rest. Yet, in its modal form. They likewise perform well when asked
to choose between pulling a rake with an intact handlethe void between here and understanding the mecha-
nisms responsible for even the average 2-year-old versus one with a clearly broken handle, as illustrated
in Figure 3A. But does this indicate that they appreciatechild’s tool use repertoire is expansive. Comparative
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Figure 3. Four Tasks Used by Povinelli and Colleagues to Investi-
gate Causal Reasoning by Chimpanzees in the Context of Tool Use
In all tasks, the goal was to pull the rake that would successfully
bring a food item within reach. (A) The broken-rake problem in which
chimpanzees were required to choose between an intact rake and
Figure 2. Apparatus and Task Used to Investigate Neural Mecha- one with a clearly broken handle. This was accomplished with mini-
nisms of Tool Use in Macaques mal difficulty. (B) The table-trap problem in which the choice was
(A) A rake that could be used as a tool to successfully capture and between pulling a rake that would cause the food item to fall into
retrieve food pellets. (B) A control manipulandum that connects a a well (left) or one in which the food item would be successfully
rake handle to a universal joint making it impossible to successfully obtained (right). Note that the rectangle on the right side of the
retrieve food pellets. (C) The experimental (1) and control (2) condi- table was painted to maintain perceptual similarity. However, it was
tions in which the monkey attempted to retrieve food pellets with clearly distinguishable from the 3D well on the left side. (C) The
the rake or manipulandum. By comparing brain activation in these inverted-rake problem where chimpanzees were asked to chose
two conditions, it is possible to separate mechanisms involved in between a rake, an upright rake, and one that had been inverted,
tool use from areas contributing to object manipulation. Adapted making it ineffective for capturing food. (D) The flimsy-tool problem
by permission from Obayashi et al. (2001). wherein chimpanzees had to select either a rigid rake or an ineffec-
tive one made of nonrigid rubber. As detailed in the text, tasks B,
C, and D proved difficult for chimpanzees to solve. Adapted by
permission from Povinelli (2000).the causal relationships between self, tool, and goal
object? Their failure on seemingly simple modifications
toward identifying and interrogating brain regions in-of this and numerous other paradigms suggests that
volved in reasoning about objects’ physical propertiesthey do not. For instance, adult animals averaged only
and causal relationships.slightly better than chance when given the choice be-
Neural Mechanisms of Causal Reasoningtween pulling a rake in the modal condition versus one
To date there are remarkably little data concerning thein which the food would, from our perspective, obviously
neural bases of processes required to understand physi-fall into a well before being pulled to within reach (Figure
cal causality of the sort necessary for complex tool use.3B). If given the choice between pulling a modal rake
On the one hand, it has long been known that patientsversus one in which the rake was inverted so as to be
with frontal/prefrontal injuries are impaired on tasks that“obviously” ineffective, they were no better than chance
demand planning and executing complex goal-oriented(Figure 3C). Chimpanzees were also at chance when
actions (Shallice, 1982). More recently, functional neu-
asked to choose between the modal rake and one modi-
roimaging studies have provided convergent evidence
fied such that the tines were constructed of flimsy rubber
for the involvement of frontal/prefrontal areas in these
that could not possibly capture the goal object (Figure processes (Fincham et al., 2002). On the other hand, as
3D). How can these inconsistencies be explained? I will point out below, the available data suggest that
Consistent with the putative homologies reviewed these regions may not be critical to understanding physi-
above, Povinelli argues that apparent similarities in the cal causality. Instead, internal models of objects’ physi-
overt behaviors of humans and chimpanzees, including cal properties and causal relationships may be con-
some aspects of tool use, may be attributed to the fact structed in areas of temporal and/or parietal cortex
that both species draw on common sensorimotor abili- associated with higher-level perceptual processing.
ties. However, what these studies reveal is that chim- Causal relationships between hands and other ob-
panzees differ profoundly from humans in their under- jects appear to be coded in the temporal cortex of mon-
standing of the abstract causal variables that govern keys. Cells within the lower bank of the superior tempo-
objects and their relationships in the physical world; ral sulcus (STS, area TEa) respond selectively to the
an understanding that begins to emerge during early observation of movements of objects caused by hands
infancy in humans (Spelke et al., 1992). As a conse- (Perrett et al., 1990). Responses are reduced when ob-
quence, they often fail at tasks that demand using an jects and hands move congruently but without making
internal model of causal relationships to anticipate physical contact. Similarly, observing one ball contact
which of two actions will result in the desired conse- and launch another versus launching in the absence of
quences. contact is associated with bilateral activity within the
The major implication of these findings is that neuro- human STS and left IPS (Blakemore et al., 2001).
scientists interested in mechanisms responsible for Neuropsychological evidence also indicates that pari-
etal and/or temporal cortex are critical to reasoningcomplex tool use might do well to direct their efforts
Neuron
204
mains suggest that the answer may lie in understanding
how the human brain represents physical causality.
Hopefully, this review will stimulate further explorations
of this fundamental question that to date has been rela-
tively overlooked by neuroscience.
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